A brief trip south to Galle revealed on a very vivid, horrifying scale the impact of the tsunami on people living in the south and east of Sri Lanka. Colombo had relatively little damage and human loss, only there is a surge of displaced people and migrants who continually come to the large city in search of employment and their familial ties. But the trail of devastation accompanies your journey down to the southernmost tip of the country. Entire houses, shops, lives and livelihoods were swept away, with the shocking remnants of their concrete slab kitchen sinks and tiled floors still jutting out. Those people killed are generally buried in mass graves along the sea-facing road. Many of the former inhabitants moved in with their families, and despite official reports that most survivors are taken care of, people still live in donated tents, forage for food and stable income, and wait on their daily relief. Ironically, you see that many people used UNHCR tents to tarp over the damage in their homes.
It was difficult to walk around the tent cities, or to gawk at the destruction, or to treat this tragedy as a tourist attraction, so I can only speak from memory (an erroneous source in itself). And it is absolutely incomprehensible that one year plus some months later that little of the aid from governments in the region, the UN funds, and NGO assistance have gotten back to the survivors. These people survived 20 years of conflict, the 'Big Wave' and now face the challenges of international 'benevolence' and 'aid capitalism.' For sure, this humanitarian disaster received the largest amount of aid and international outreach in history, but the methods of distribution, monitoring funds, local consultation and ethics have been grotesque, imperial, shady to say the least.
For instance, it's a massive mistake to have handed over the billions of funds to a corrupt, warmongering government, who's already misspent monies, in part on military expenses (whoah - how familiar is this experience in the western hemisphere?). More fundamental are the inherent flaws of the international aid architecture, that do not take in the very particular circumstances within the country needing the relief. Namely, they do not take in the complexities of aid in post-conflict recovery or on using the established networks of organisations already working in the country/region. Instead, alot of organisations inexperienced in Sri Lanka flooded the affected areas with their well-meanings and good intentions, but contributed to chaos and poor decisions. Many foreign volunteers do not speak the language and treat survivors with paternalism rather than listening with compassion. According to Sri Lankan social scientist, Dr. Darini Rajasingham Senanayake, "Each one of their air tickets and per diems may have paid for the rebuilding of a couple of tsunami-devastated homes." It does more good to employ/mobilise the underemployed university graduates, who may have a more sound grasp on the local situation, to carry out the relief work. Some of the negative reprecussions from the uncoordinated or ill-advised programmes can be seen as a disjuncture between state control of immediate international funds and its own agenda, and community knowledge and development initiatives.
One of the most gruesome outcomes from lack of coordination, includes how the looming possibility of returning to conflict, created a demand for LTTE recruits. Many children orphaned by the tsunami since have been recruited as child soldiers and trafficked into sex work to cater to the foreign paedophiles. In addition, areas that cater more to business and tourism received more immediate attention and relief in order to quickly resume one of the main service industries on the island. Approximately 55,000 temporary houses have been built in southern region but only one around Jaffna. Tamil people often face added, unjust hardships by the Government of Sri Lanka, who penalise survivors for being in the 'wrong' part of the country, not on the Singhalese side. Preventing relief agencies to come into the north and east by the LTTE, as well as the government's poor decisions not to focus on largely Tamil communities north, could exacerbate the teetering conflict. Moreover, while temporary housing is more available, permanent housing and strategies for long term recovery are still unfolding.
It is clear that the enormous funds pouring in internationally need to be held accountable to the survivors and distribution in Sri Lanka requires more effective monitoring. UN agencies have good transparency in terms of their funding expenditure, but bureacracy has tied up alot of the aid, instead of getting back to people (UN is angrily frowned upon here - best not to mention affiliation). As well, using aid to attain political ends exacerbates the conflict and hardships endured by the affected communities. How do we link established organisations working here to (larger, international) organisations that have the capabilities to expand project operations so that these juggernauts of relief and recovery can really manage sustained development?
In reference to article by:
Dr. Darini Rajasingham Senanayake."Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Management: Lessons from Sri Lanka and India" ASEAN Roundtable 2005: The Asian Tsunami: Implications for Regional Development and Security, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore
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